Last year, while studying for the finals somewhere in the Diamond building, I found myself arguing with a friend about a bill set to be adopted in Georgia, the small republic in the Caucasus, a region spanning Eastern Europe and Western Asia. We were sitting across from each other in a seminar room, as I scrolled through Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, reading about Georgians taking to the streets of Tbilisi to protest what they saw as a pro-Russian bill. When I voiced concerns about what this meant for Georgia’s European Union (EU) aspirations, my friend argued there was nothing particularly wrong or anti-European about the bill.
But, many controversies surrounded it. The proposed legislation angered people because it was an attempt to resurrect the same two bills proposed by the mainstream party Georgian Dream (GD) in 2023, which were later withdrawn following the mass protests and public opposition. One would require non-governmental organizations, alongside the media, to disclose their annual income and funds. If they received anything above 20% from abroad, the organizations would be labeled as agents of foreign influence. The second bill aimed to increase penalties for noncompliance and target individuals. At that time, neither of the bills was adopted: the first one was defeated in Parliament, while the latter was withdrawn. Nevertheless, GD began lobbying for the legislation again a year later. However, the foreign agent label would be replaced with one of an “organization carrying the interests of a foreign power.”
Georgia’s attempts to align with the West intensified after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As Georgia itself was a victim of Russian invasion in 2008, with two of its regions — South Ossetia and Abkhazia — occupied by Russian troops, the country applied for EU candidate status on March 3, 2022. The European Commission, which represents the executive body of the EU, issued 12 conditions and priorities that the Georgian government must address before moving forward with negotiations. Two of these conditions were guaranteeing “a free, professional, pluralistic, and independent media environment” and ensuring “the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes at all levels.” Steering away from the controversial bill, which targeted independent media and civil society, signaled Georgia’s preparedness. In December 2023, the EU granted Georgia candidate status for “the genuine aspirations of the overwhelming majority of its citizens to join the European Union,” rather than for any substantial effort by the government to address the required conditions.
Yet, as the GD started renegotiating the foreign agent bill in 2024, Georgians returned to the streets discontented and angry. Hundreds of NGOs signed a joint statement denouncing the bill. The EU, NATO, and even the U.S. voiced their concern over what they saw as democratic backsliding. The protests soon turned violent, with people throwing objects at the police, while law enforcement officers started using pepper spray. Though it was an expression of opposition to the bill, the protests were also a clear and loud sign of a desired alignment with the EU. People understood quite well that if this bill were to pass, all the progress made on EU membership would be lost, and they would find themselves back in the grips of Moscow, with no hope of coming out of the inextricably tangled web of corruption and oligarchy.
Watching the violent demonstrations and how the bill ultimately turned into law, I tried to explain to my friend the importance of the event and how condemnable it was. “If I were a citizen of Georgia, I’d like to know who is receiving funding from abroad,” he said. There was nothing wrong with the disclosure of funds and income. The problem was labeling organizations that received external funding as foreign agents. The law’s adoption in Georgia drew undeniable parallels to Russia’s 2012 law, which was a response to the 2011 Bolotnaya protests, where several civil organizations condemned the election results as illegitimate. Similar to Russia’s case, the bill was a symbol of Georgian power-owners who vilified the opposition — whether it was political opponents, media, civil organizations, or protestors — by framing them as instruments of a globalist agenda orchestrated by the West. What GD classified as foreign interference was merely support for the overwhelmingly pro-European sentiment from other members of the Georgian parliament. So, what my friend and the majority of GD saw as a necessary piece of legislation to strengthen the country’s sovereignty was a betrayal of the average Georgian’s aspirations.
Despite the voiced concerns and threats of sanctions from the EU, the GD held a parliamentary majority and managed to approve the bill and override the president’s veto. As a result, the EU halted Georgia’s accession process and froze financial aid in June 2024. Georgia’s democratic backsliding continued with GD winning the majority in the parliamentary elections of October 2024 (53.93%) and local elections of October 2025 (81.73%). Fears over election fraud persisted, as several independent reports documented incidents of carousel voting, infringements upon the secrecy of the ballot, and patterns of electoral irregularity.
So, when I read about the recent protests in Tbilisi following the local elections on October 5, I remembered that conversation in Diamond a year ago. From afar, one might be amused by people’s reaction to legislation that seems like a linguistic abstraction. They might be startled by a nation’s apparent inability to change its government, or by the seeming contradiction between Georgia’s pro-European constituency and the election results. But, the issue may lie not with the electorate, but rather within Georgia’s political ecosystem, where a corrupted judiciary, an entrenched oligarchy, and calculated political engineering have produced a self-perpetuating system that facilitates and sustains autocracy.
Meanwhile, Europe celebrates Moldova’s recent election results, where a pro-EU party secured a majority for the second time (as I wrote a few weeks ago). But, it must not overlook that Georgia’s dissatisfaction may well be the product of Brussels’s neglect. Georgians still protest, still dream of Europe… but I’m no longer sure Europe dreams of them.
~ Cristina Panaguta `26
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